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En este artículo, se hace una reseña histórica de la regulación legal de la
sexualidad y las reivindicaciones de derechos sexuales en Sudáfrica y en
Zimbabwe, analizando las implicaciones para los derechos de género
como parte de la ciudadanía en la época post-colonial.  Enfocándose en
la interacción de las Constituciones formales y la Ley informal y tradi-
cional en el desarrollo diferenciada de ciudadanía y derechos, el artículo
destaca la manutención de la subjetividad legal parcial de la mujer du-
rante los cambios en el sistema de autoridad desde linaje hasta estados-
naciones. Esas tensiones entre el formalismo legal de derecho y la au-
toridad histórica de las estructuras tradicionales sirven de base para la
regulación del sexo y para los reclamos de derechos sexuales dentro de
esos dos países, y sirven de marco para una discusión acerca de la forma
en que los programas y las políticas de salud sexual pueden interactuar
más efectivamente con el desarrollo de un marco legal de respecto a la
autonomía en el ejercicio de la sexualidad.
Cet article présente le contexte historique des lois réglementant la sexu-
alité et les demandes de droits sexuels en Afrique du Sud et au
Zimbabwe, en analysant leurs implications sur les droits relatifs à l'ori-
entation sexuelle qui résultent du concept de citoyenneté post-coloniale.
Il discute principalement l'interaction entre les Constitutions officielles
et le Droit coutumier informel pour expliquer le développement con-
trasté des pratiqueset des droits, et il met en lumière la constance de la
subjectivité légale partielle des femmes parallèlement aux transferts
d'autorité,  depuis le clan jusqu'à l'État nation. Ces tensions entre le for-
malisme légal du droit et l'autorité historique des structures coutu-
mières étayent la réglementation du sexe et les demandes de droits sex-
uels dans ces deux pays, et elles créent le cadre d'une discussion sur une
meilleure coordination des programmes et politiques de santé sexuelle
avec le développement d’un pouvoir personnel en matière de séxualité.
Abstract
This article historicizes the legal regulation of sexuality and claims to
sexual rights in South Africa and Zimbabwe, analyzing their implica-
tions. Focusing on the interaction of formal Constitutions and informal
customary law in the differential development of agency and rights, it
highlights the constancy of women’s partial legal subjectivity alongside
shifts in authority from lineage to nation-state. The tensions between
the legal formalism of rights, and the historical authority of customary
structures buttress the regulation of sex and the claims to sexual rights
within these two countries, and they frame a discussion of how sexual-
health programs and policies might better engage with the development
of sexual agency.
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(DIS)CONTINUITIES OF CUSTOM IN
ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA: 
The Implications for Gendered
and Sexual Rights 
Oliver Phillips
Since 1990, Southern Africa has witnessed a dramatic
increase in the discussion of sexual behaviors, the visibility
of sexual identities, and related conflicts over associated
rights.  These discussions and conflicts have become central
to agendas of policy, research, health campaigns, and defini-
tions of national entitlement.  As the most active protago-
nists in this burgeoning recognition of the significance of
the sexual, Zimbabwe and South Africa appear at first
glance to have approached sexuality in distinctly contrary
ways.  But closer inspection reveals that their approaches
are strikingly similar: both recognize sexuality to be an in-
strument of social cohesion, whose current discursive
prevalence is not simply a result of efforts to prevent the
transmission of HIV/AIDS.  Instead, this increased discus-
sion and visibility of sexuality is deeply implicated in long-
contested gender struggles as well as in the very different at-
tempts each nation has made to define itself at its moment
of post-colonial delivery.  The formulation of successful
policy interventions around sexual health thus requires an
understanding of the historical continuity that has brought
sexuality center-stage, as well as an awareness of the cur-
rent framing of state power in relation to sexual rights and
their impact on the exercise of agency. 
Sexuality’s emergence as a key marker of citizenship
was most pointedly signified in the mid-1990s through the
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homosexual’s incorporation into the body of newly entitled
citizens in South Africa and the homosexual’s almost si-
multaneous extirpation from the national polity in
Zimbabwe, Nambia, Zambia, Swaziland, Kenya, Uganda,
Tanzania, and Botswana.1 Within months of Zimbabwean
President Mugabe’s proclamation that “I don’t believe they
(homosexuals) should have any rights at all,” and the la-
beling of Zimbabwean homosexuals as the “festering finger
endangering the body” that government must “chop off,”
South Africa became the first country in the world to ratify
a constitution that included a prohibition of discrimination
on the grounds of sexual orientation.2,3 While neighboring
states more or less replicated the Zimbabwean position, the
distinctive inclusivity of the South African approach moved
beyond the decriminalization of homosexual acts, encom-
passing more broadly the positive affirmation of equal rights
for gays and lesbians in relation to employment benefits,
adoption of children, and immigration through partnership.4
In addition, since that time the recognition of same-sex
domestic partnerships is being formulated.5
As these measures deliver specific rights of formal
equality and unsettle the gendered hierarchy so funda-
mental to exclusive heteronormativity, they are more than
a symbolic inclusion of homosexuals into the social body.
They contrast markedly with neighboring Zimbabwe’s re-
jection of homosexuality as a “white man’s disease” integral
to the colonialist corruption of “traditional” African so-
ciety.  Elsewhere, I have analyzed the role this “white-
washing” of homosexuality played in discrediting the in-
creased sexual autonomy of Zimbabwean women, posi-
tioning such autonomy as another alleged form of Western
imperialism.6 Both the sexual inclusivity of citizenship in
the new South Africa and the sexual exclusivity of citizen-
ship in Zimbabwe are intrinsic to the gendered construction
of notions of entitlement and belonging in these post-
colonial states.  
The ubiquity of sexuality and sexual rights in discus-
sions of citizenship in both countries is not simply a result
of the need to engage sexuality in strategic attempts to con-
tain the spread of HIV/AIDS.7 This ubiquity is, moreover,
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an outcome of the current political and socio-historical tra-
jectories of these two countries.  In each case, sexuality has
become integral to citizenship: it is explicitly recruited to
serve as an index of national belonging in a way that, as this
article demonstrates, goes beyond sexual orientation, be-
havior, or identity, to the very base of gender relations.
Furthermore, HIV/AIDS is but one aspect of a multi-dimen-
sional context rich with the conflicts, negotiations, and op-
portunities that characterize what are arguably revolu-
tionary moments in the national histories of South Africa
and Zimbabwe.  The presence of HIV/AIDS increases, there-
fore, the already significant role of sexuality. 
The analysis in this piece suggests that there is a real
danger that an inadequate understanding of these national
histories can lead well-intentioned sexual health interven-
tions to unwittingly reproduce, and in so doing compound,
the problems of historical context.  Information alone is not
enough to reduce women’s disproportionate vulnerability to
HIV/AIDS, as knowledge of risk does not automatically en-
able agency. The context through which agency is developed
or constrained is defined by formal instruments of law and
mapped out by informal mechanisms of social custom; ana-
lyzing the history of the ways in which these elements have
interacted in Southern Africa suggests that addressing one
part of this equation but not the other may well be danger-
ously counterproductive.
The transition out of a state of minority rule by white
settlers took place 24 years ago in Zimbabwe and 10 years
ago in South Africa.  Enormous differences in contemporary
contexts and procedural priorities have produced what are
evidently very different approaches to human rights and gov-
ernance.  While there is obviously a complex multiplicity of
historical, political, and cultural factors instrumental in
defining the limits of citizenship and post-colonial identity,
this article focuses on only two of the mechanisms that have
framed the contrasting articulation of sexual rights in each of
these states.  Constitutions are the formal foundations of
state power and circumscribe the different possibilities of
policy in these two countries.  Similarly, “traditional
custom” is an informal but institutionalized mechanism of
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social regulation, and it is central to negotiating the tensions
that exist between claims to cultural authenticity and aspi-
rations to equality with regard to human rights.  This article
will restrict itself to a consideration of the interaction of
these two elements (Constitution and custom) in these two
states, whose different treatment of sexual relations is sym-
bolically and practically central to their broader definitions
of rights, subjectivity, and citizenship.  Focusing on the rela-
tionship between the constitutional platform of a state and
the customary relations of its society highlights the ways in
which sexual hierarchies and gender relations become either
entrenched or transformed in specifically post-colonial mo-
ments of fissure and reinvention.8
The Colonial Legacy of Gender and Rights
The contrasting treatment of both gendered and sexual
rights (as well as broader issues of diversity and dissent) in
present-day Zimbabwe and South Africa arises partly out of
their different responses to a particular post-colonial dy-
namic.  This dynamic consists of a tension between as-
serting, on the one hand, a “traditional” lineage-based cul-
ture that prioritizes interests presented as collective and in-
voked through claims to group rights and ethnic sovereignty,
and, on the other hand, the political culture of a “modern”
nation-state where individual autonomous citizens are enti-
tled to rights of equality that are construed as universal.9
John Comaroff explains that the continuing prevalence of
these contradictory registers of primal sovereignty and
radical individualism derives from the colonial discourse of
rights, which created “ethnic subjects, racinated and recast
in an often antagonistic dialectic of construction and nega-
tion.”10 Indeed, this “antagonistic dialectic” is evident in
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  In the
Charter, these contradictory registers result in the articula-
tion of not only individual rights and freedoms, but also
group rights over the individual as well as individual duties
to the collective to an extent not reflected in other interna-
tional human rights treaties or conventions.11 For the pur-
poses of this article, however, the most pertinent manifesta-
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tion of this “antagonistic dialectic” is the historical treat-
ment of women living under African customary law in both
colonial and post-colonial periods. 
Research by Martin Chanock and others has shown
how the colonial need for legal consistency and pre-
dictability effectively rigidified the contextual fluidity that
had previously been the hallmark of African custom.12
Systematizing diverse localized customs into one, uni-
formly applicable African Customary Law had the effect of
displacing inherent mechanisms of accountability and en-
trenching gerontocratic and patriarchal relations of power.
In the early colonial period, customary law became a pivotal
tool in jockeying for position within the changing structures
of African society.  Chanock describes this as a battle “for
the control of labor in the changing conditions of the rural
economy,” with specific reference to the labor of wives,
their offspring, and the rights to the fruits of those labors.13
Older patriarchs attempted to sustain their traditional posi-
tion of authority in the face of the growing economic power
of younger wage-earning men, while women were forced to
become increasingly innovative in gaining access to the few
informal and unofficial means by which they had earlier
been able to exercise power.14 A review of the development
of laws around marriage and adultery in colonial Rhodesia
makes clear that the people testifying to colonial authorities
about the content of customary laws are predominantly
elder men of standing within their communities.15 This is
unsurprising given the gerontocratic and patriarchal social
structures of these communities and given the similarly hi-
erarchical structure of the colonial authorities’ society.
Moreover, any initial desire on the part of the colonial au-
thorities to emancipate African women from what they per-
ceived to be “primitive” and oppressive structures of
kinship was rapidly replaced by a recognition that their au-
thority was based on the cooperation of African chiefs and
headmen.16 For this reason, some of the early colonial laws
impacting directly on women and their sexual independ-
ence evince Comaroff’s “anatagonistic dialectic of construc-
tion and negation”: they demonstrate precisely the tension
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between definitions of personhood that were located in lin-
eage and collective identity, and definitions of emancipated
individual subjectivity that adhere to the modern state.
The earliest legislative product of this initial emancipa-
tory concern was the Native Marriage Ordinance (NMO) of
1901.  This ordinance had the dual and sometimes contra-
dictory aims of constructing a legal framework to support
African marriages while also preventing African women
from being forced into marriage.  It immediately bestowed
on women a measure of potential autonomy from men who,
under customary law, were perpetually their legal
guardians:
The African idea that sexual identity [behavior] was an
aspect of lineage membership, and that individual mem-
bers were answerable to the family group for the uses
they made of their sexuality, was undermined at a stroke
by the Ordinance’s provision that no woman should be
made to marry against her will. The women’s rights were
given priority over the rights of the lineage. . . . In effect,
the State was usurping the rights of family heads to con-
trol the sexual choices of members of their households
and lineages.17 (my own explanation in italics)18
Ironically, this shift from lineage to state regulation was
subsequently compounded by the attempts of chiefs and
their headmen to use the colonial law to bring women back
into their control.  In persuading the colonial authorities to
pass the Native Adultery Punishment Ordinance (NAPO) of
1916, African patriarchs specifically prohibited married
African women from an act that was permitted for anyone
else, penalizing exclusively and specifically the errant-
married woman.19 While this ordinance was aimed at dis-
empowering and restricting women, it also brought African
women’s particular social status increasingly within the
realm of legal regulation.  Implicitly, it constituted in law
the criminality of African women’s sexual autonomy, initi-
ating a partial legal subjectivity that extended no further
than women’s capacity to be disciplined.  That is, women
were treated as legal subjects in that they could be disci-
plined for committing the offence of adultery, but they did
not have the subjective legal status to be offended by a
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man’s adulterous behavior, nor did they have any further ca-
pacity to act in law other than through their male guardian. 
Nevertheless, in constituting the criminality of
women’s sexual autonomy, the NAPO implicitly relied on a
notion of women’s independent action and their specific re-
sponsibility for this agency.  Similarly, while the NMO af-
firmed a regime of marriage in which woman had no legal
subjectivity other than as offenders/adulterers, it simulta-
neously protected women from being pledged in marriage.
In each case, the transfer out of lineage and into state con-
trol was predicated on a shift from the power of the patri-
arch to the rights and obligations of an individual; but in re-
ality it transferred onto women a partial subjectivity that
was expedient for maintaining traditional relations of
power.20 This subjectivity was partial in two senses: first, it
was a negative subjectivity, as it was restricted to giving
women the status to be arrested as offenders. And second, it
was an incomplete subjectivity: as women had no legal
standing of their own (they could only operate in law
through a male guardian), it did not deliver direct or proper
recourse to the protection offered by the law. But it was also
expedient as it was invested in women “solely as adjuncts
to the group, means to the anachronistic end of clan sur-
vival, rather than as valuable in themselves.”21
The lingering historical effects of this partial subjec-
tivity are the source of many of the conflicts around gender
and sexuality in contemporary Southern Africa.  The con-
cept of a sexuality rooted in the self rather than in lineage
and family is the basis of the sexual-autonomy claims fo-
menting Southern African anxieties around both homosex-
uality and women’s sexual agency.  Similarly, in relation to
such things as rape, while there is some recognition in
common law of women’s legal subjectivity, customary law
continues to temper women’s ability to exercise any full
legal subjectivity.22 It is precisely this tension between the
“traditional” lineage-based subjugation of African women
to their guardians (primal sovereignty) and the contrary no-
tion of the individual subjectivity of a legal person (radical
individualism—arguably fundamental to claiming human
rights) that pushes and pulls the vacillating attempts of the
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Zimbabwean government to initially empower and then re-
strain women.23 There is a crippling ambivalence in devel-
oping the notion of individual rights while at the same time
promoting “traditional” family structures and the priority of
customary law.  Yet, South African attempts to overcome
this ambivalence have not been unequivocally successful, in
large part because the legacy of women’s partial subjectivity
is so deeply embedded in discourses of sexuality.
Constitutional Frameworks and Customary Law
In South Africa, the drafting and adoption of a new
Constitution was the “primary objective” of multi-party ne-
gotiations that lasted nearly four years.24 An entirely new
Constitution was necessary to ensure the abolition of a
system that was beyond reform.  Apartheid systematized in-
equalities through separation, differentiation, and the ex-
plicit provision of partial subjectivities according to race.
For the vast majority of South Africans, their race gave them
the strong possibility of becoming offenders in law while si-
multaneously restricting their agency in or recourse to law
as an instrument of protection and rights.  The new
Constitution explicitly premises itself on “diversity,”
clearly stating that differences between people should never
again be used as a force of division and should rather be seen
as a positive asset in building a strong democracy.25 This is
a principle enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights, which contains the Equality Clause, implic-
itly rebuking partial subjectivities as it prohibits discrimi-
nation “on any one or more grounds including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, be-
lief, culture, language, and birth.”26 “Many of the categories
listed above can be problematized,” writes Mikki Van Zyl,
. . . but as a broad collection they represent many of the
concepts that have formed the basis of critiques about
exclusions in existing interpretations of citizenship in
modern democracies: five out of the sixteen are related
to gender and sexuality, and six link to racialization.
Hence, it could be argued that the Equality Clause in the
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South African Constitution represents a quantum leap
in formal rights for previously excluded groups.27
This “quantum leap” is given added impetus by the
Constitution’s explicit protection of social and economic as
well as civil and political rights, and its express authoriza-
tion of affirmative action.28 But of most pertinence here is
the clear decision not to dilute the Equality Clause with any
exemptions for customary law, despite the entreaties of tra-
ditional leaders who saw the Equality Clause as a direct
threat to the patriarchal structures of customary relations.
Representatives from women’s organizations had the unwa-
vering support of the vast majority of the political parties,
and this conclusively ensured the defeat of the traditional
leaders’ attempts to exclude customary law from the provi-
sions of the Equality Clause.29 Comaroff’s conflict between
radical individualism and primal sovereignty was thus re-
solved firmly in support of the former, a point made clear by
Penuell Maduna, currently South Africa’s Minister of
Justice, who was a member of the Constitution’s
Negotiating Council and the Ad Hoc Committee on
Fundamental Rights:
One of the customary rights is the right of the tradi-
tional leader to lord it over you.  I have never for one
second in my life lived under a traditional leader, and
I’m very much a Black South African. Traditional law
plays no role at all in my life. . . . To follow the tradi-
tional law of succession, my son is my heir and my
daughters wouldn’t get anything.  Is that what I want to
happen to my children? They would live perpetually
under male domination, and I honestly, seriously, and
utterly believe in the equality of the sexes. . . . There is
a tension between a Western-oriented society, as some
people want to impose on us, and a pure African,
“Africanist” society. I think we are a mixture of all sorts
of things but essentially, we place the individual at the
center of human activity.30
Through the transitional period of the interim
Constitution, South Africans quickly became accustomed
to a context within which the Constitutional Court has
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supreme jurisdiction.31 Decisions by the Constitutional
Court indicate the clarity of their jurisdiction over govern-
ment, political parties, and even the Executive arm of gov-
ernment.32 The consensus that allows such jurisdictional
authority arises from both the painstakingly extensive and
unusually inclusive process of participation in the drafting
of the Constitution, as well as the emphasis on rights
(whether civil, political, social, or economic) in a state
whose prior absence of rights had dramatically highlighted
their necessity for all South Africans.
In direct contrast to South Africa, Zimbabwe’s
Constitution reflects a clear prioritization of primal sover-
eignty over radical individualism as it specifically exempts
customary, family, and personal law from the fundamental
rights and freedoms guaranteed by its Declaration of
Rights.33 The Constitution currently in place in Zimbabwe
was adopted in 1980 after the country’s independence;
though unlike South Africa, it was neither the “center-
piece” nor the “primary objective” of years of detailed and
rigorous negotiations.34,35 It contains standard default
clauses that tend to appear in the post-independence
Constitutions of other former British colonies in Africa,
with the exception of a few provisions restricting the extent
to which the new government could transform political
structures and redistribute economic capital.36 The ruling
party (ZANU-PF) therefore came to view the Constitution
as a frustrating obstacle blocking the implementation of
their policies and the post-colonial transformation of the
country.37 President Mugabe has frequently lambasted it as
a “British” document and has resisted the superior jurisdic-
tion of the Constitution and the Supreme Court.  This has
often brought the Supreme Court into direct conflict with
the Executive, as the government has repeatedly defied
court orders and used the notion of primal sovereignty to ra-
tionalize as a policy of “indigenization,” the replacement of
those judges who uphold the Constitution when it is chal-
lenged by government.38 Mugabe himself told a ZANU-PF
Congress that “the courts can do what they want.  They are
not courts for our people and we should not even be de-
fending ourselves in these courts.”39
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In 2000, the government proposed a new Constitution,
making explicit its determination to increase executive
powers in the face of popular opposition and so losing the
referendum necessary to enact it.40 This draft Constitution
of 2000 did, however, confirm the government’s dedication
to promoting the register of primal sovereignty and the ac-
companying partial subjectivity of women, as it included
provisions affirming that the majority of women should not
have the right to own property and offered a generally re-
duced commitment to individual and women’s rights.
President Mugabe is said to have personally drafted a clause
that permitted the over-riding of any individual right in the
name of “public morality and public security,” specifically
including a prohibition of gay marriage.41
The government’s evident disinterest in having a
Constitution that provides a platform for women’s equality is
further affirmed by the failure of the Constitution to include
both sex and gender in its list of prohibited grounds of dis-
crimination. In 1996, the 14th amendment to the
Constitution removed “sex” from this list and replaced it
with “gender.” Previously, while discrimination on the
grounds of biological sex was prohibited, discrimination on
the grounds of gender was not, so that even those women
who were living under civil law were vulnerable to the many
gender stereotypes of socio-cultural origin that underpin dis-
crimination.  Subsequent to the 1996 amendment, discrimi-
nation on anatomical or biological grounds (e.g., pregnancy,
menstruation, childbirth, lactation, or physical attributes)
was no longer prohibited by the Constitution.  This fudging
stands in marked contrast to the careful articulation of so
many different forms of discrimination in South Africa’s
Equality Clause, and, as the Zimbabwean amendment was
enacted after the South African Constitution, it is unlikely
that the Zimbabwean drafters and legislators were unaware of
the distinction between sex and gender.  The Supreme Court
has not yet been required to provide any interpretive guidance
on this issue; but the possibility that they could provide a
wide interpretation that includes both sex and gender is re-
mote.  First, because such an interpretation is far removed
from the clear and direct implication of an amendment that
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explicitly replaces sex with gender (demonstrating a con-
certed consideration of what might be the distinction be-
tween the two terms); and second, because the new Supreme
Court bench is now more amenable to direction from the gov-
ernment, which drafted the amendment in the first place.
The current Constitution of Zimbabwe seems unclear
about the distinction between sex and gender.  Its
drafters appear to have thought sex and gender were in-
terchangeable synonyms.  For if they were clear about
this distinction and clear about why both (sex and
gender) should be prohibited as grounds for discrimina-
tion, then one can only conclude that the Constitution
of Zimbabwe has been crafted deliberately to discrimi-
nate against women.42
Deliberate or not, the end result is that the rights of-
fered to women through the Constitution are limited on a
number of counts.  Their partial subjectivity is reinscribed
through the Constitution as their recourse to law is contin-
gent on either their detachment from the traditional secu-
rity of lineage or on their attachment to a man—and even
after these conditions are realized, their right to equality is
limited.  This is despite the fact that Zimbabwe was a sig-
natory to The Declaration on Gender and Development
passed by the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) Council of Ministers in February 1997. This decla-
ration contained a strong commitment to mainstreaming
gender equality in national policy and “ensuring the eradi-
cation of all gender inequalities in the region.”43
Legislation, Policy, and Court Judgments
During Zimbabwe’s Independence, ZANU-PF had been
openly supportive of the principle of gender equality; and
soon after assuming power, it passed the Legal Age of
Majority Act (LAMA) in 1982.44 This conferred legal sub-
jectivity on all Zimbabweans over the age of 18—immedi-
ately granting women the unprecedented possibilities of
legal subjectivity.  Thus, women no longer need the consent
of their guardian to enter into a civil marriage.  But the ma-
jority of Zimbabwean women marry under customary law.
Section 23 of the Constitution means that this majority of
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women still find themselves under the authority of a male
guardian, have no legal subjectivity of their own, and their
recourse to the fundamental rights and freedoms listed in
the Constitution is strictly limited by custom.  The most
explicit example of this in practice is the Supreme Court
finding in Magaya v. Magaya, where the property accumu-
lated by a woman was given to a younger brother who had
had no role in its accumulation.45 The decision provoked
outrage as women’s groups and human rights NGOs ac-
cused the Supreme Court of a regressive judgment that re-
versed any progress in women’s rights made since 1980.  But
their anger should rightfully have been directed at a
Constitution that was, in fact, correctly interpreted.46
Zimbabwean women witnessed their government’s flir-
tation with a move to gender equality in the years immedi-
ately following Independence, only to find it subsequently
retracted with growing censure of independent women.
During the 1980s, the state carried out random street clean-
ups in major urban areas of any women found to be without
a marriage certificate or proof of employment—an action
whose objectives were replicated in the 1990’s when mobs
of men stripped women naked in the street for wearing
mini-skirts that were “too short.”47,48 In all of these cases,
the harassment of women was justified by their denuncia-
tion as mahure (prostitutes), a word frequently used to de-
scribe women who display economic independence or, most
particularly, sexual autonomy.  The narrow confines of re-
spectability were outlined in the early 1980s by the then
Zimbabwean Minister of Home Affairs who suggested that
the abolition of lobola (bride wealth) would “legalize prosti-
tution” as “a woman for whom lobola was not paid could
easily move to another man.”49
Such “traditional” resistance to the mere possibility of
women’s sexual autonomy explains why homosexuality
presents such a challenge to customary relations.  Accepting
lesbianism implies that women can (and might choose to)
survive without men, let alone without men as their
guardian, a “problem” compounded by the fact that a les-
bian will bring no lobola into the family, thereby affecting
the ability of her brothers to pay for their own wives and un-
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dermining the economic base of reproductive culture.  This
is a direct illustration of the conflict between the register of
primal sovereignty, whereby sexual relations are defined in
relation to lineage, and individual rights, whereby sexual re-
lations are the distinct manifestation of individual au-
tonomous choice.
A woman’s ability to choose her partner is a precondi-
tion for her recognition as a fully entitled legal subject and
locates her sexual independence at the center of broader
structures of social and economic power.  The refusal of this
independent choice has been at the root of women’s sus-
tained partial subjectivity and was a source of the recent
concern about homosexuality in Zimbabwe.  The denigra-
tion of homosexuals invariably invoked cultural signifiers
to depict them as foreign to Zimbabwean culture, thereby
relating the issue specifically to the register of primal
sovereignty and suggesting that homosexuality was being
imposed at western insistence:  “Homosexuality is unnat-
ural and there is no question ever of allowing these people
to behave worse than dogs and pigs. . . . What we are being
persuaded to accept is sub-animal behavior and we will
never allow it here.”50-52
This statement was made in Shona, which gives “dogs”
(imbwa) particular idiomatic significance consistent with
Mugabe’s calls for a return to “our traditional values that
make us human beings.”53 He thereby invokes notions of
ubuntu (or munhu in Shona) that refer to Africanist concep-
tions that the humanity of individuals is derived from the
society around them and makes explicit his reliance on the
register of primal sovereignty.54 At issue, however, is not so
much his reliance on these notions, but his interpretation of
them in such a way as to leave little space for individual
rights.  While this interpretative strategy is clearly sup-
ported by the Zimbabwean Constitution, it is quite different
from that emerging under the South African Constitution.55
In South Africa, distinguishing “living” customary law
from the “formal” customary law that was constructed in
the colonial encounter (as outlined earlier) allows cus-
tomary law to be critically reappraised and reproduced in a
more organic, rights-receptive form. Thus, while the
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Equality Clause will always trump customary law, consid-
erable value is still given to “living” customary law so that
it is “receptive to changing conditions and . . . could be ap-
plied and developed in light of the rights and values of the
Constitution.”56 The decisions in Amod and Moseneke each
deal with a widow married under different customary or re-
ligious arrangements and emphasize that “proper consider-
ation has to be given to . . . the dignity of widows and their
ability to enjoy a rightful share of the family’s worldly
goods.”57 This renders impossible the ruling that was so un-
avoidable for the Zimbabwe Supreme Court in Magaya v.
Magaya, even though customary arrangements of inheri-
tance are historically very similar in the two countries.58
Similarly, the South African Recognition of Customary
Marriages Act gives women full majority status and the
right to acquire property in their own names, thereby recog-
nizing the value of customary law in many people’s lives
while formally removing the constraints of women’s partial
subjectivity. Predictably, the new Constitution has also fos-
tered a considerable amount of equality legislation of direct
application to all women, while the Constitutional Court
has delivered a number of judgments affirming formal rights
of equality for same-sex couples.59,60
A more recent Constitutional Court ruling, however,
provides an indication of the limits of sexual autonomy and
individual rights in the new South Africa. In the case of
Jordan, the majority judgment found that where the Sexual
Offences Act criminalized sex workers but not their clients
(sex purchasers), there was no gender discrimination as the
prohibition on prostitution applied to both men and women
sex workers.61,62 While Justices O’Regan and Sachs dissented
from the majority finding on this question of gender dis-
crimination, all Justices of the Court were unanimously
agreed that the prohibition of sex work was consistent with
the Constitutional rights to privacy, dignity, freedom, secu-
rity of the person, and economic activity, and that its de-
criminalization was a matter for the legislature rather than
the Constitutional Court. 
This seems an unusually cautious and restrained ap-
proach for the Constitutional Court to take with regard to
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its law-making role. The failure of the Court to recognize
sex workers (acknowledged to be predominantly women) as
frequently representative of the most marginalized groups
in society is surprising, as it is they who are most desper-
ately in need and most explicitly deprived of rights (social,
economic, civil, and political). There are persuasive public-
health arguments for decriminalization, and it is arguable
that these are also the logical extension of many of the
Constitution’s founding principles. But these arguments de-
pend on the effective removal of sexuality and law from a
discourse of morality and the adoption of a framework of
health, harm reduction, worker’s rights, and pleasure (as op-
posed to reproduction). 
The Jordan ruling, however, ignores the need to pro-
mote a context in which sex workers might develop greater
agency. On the contrary, their criminality and vulnerability
are certified in this decision and the moral borders that sig-
nify the acceptable limits of sexual agency are established.
The unanimity in the Jordan decision suggests that sex
workers are seen as having so remote a claim on “inno-
cence” that even a body so accepting of rights as the South
African Constitutional Court could not grant their entitle-
ment to legitimate status.63 In this way, some aspects of the
historical sexual hierarchies so clearly articulated by Gayle
Rubin remain unchanged, and the limits of South Africa’s
transformative trajectory are clearly delineated.64
Sara Jagwanth and Christina Murray point out that
much of the gender litigation in the South African
Constitutional Court has involved relatively privileged
groups, whereas those marginalized in multiple ways—
those whose interests the Constitution was most intended
to protect—are in fact the people who have received the
least benefit.65 It is also important to recognize that these
are formal rights that still need to be properly embedded in
order for them to be accessed and realized by all but the
most litigious. This argument goes some way to affirming
Mikki Van Zyl’s suggestion that the Constitution should be
seen as an “enabling tool:”
Though the first steps have been won through the en-
shrining of sexual rights in the Constitution, the struggle
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is far from over. The actual articulation of those rights still
depends on positionality, agency, and the manner in which
those rights are interpreted, negotiated and implemented
or practiced within the institutions of governance.66
Van Zyl’s caution is borne out by some key disparities be-
tween the Constitution’s promise and the African National
Congress (ANC) government’s policies, the most striking of
which is their past refusal to supply anti-retroviral treat-
ments to those infected with HIV/AIDS. Prior to April 2002,
government policy forbade even doctors and nurses in state
hospitals from providing rape survivors with anti-retroviral
treatment as post-exposure prophylaxis against infection
with HIV.67 This policy was derived from President Mbeki’s
public adoption of the “dissident” position that denies any
link between HIV and AIDS, for to provide anti-retrovirals
in any situation implies that they might actually be effec-
tive.68 Such a stance demonstrated significant reluctance to
seriously engage with the implications of gender power,
sexual relations, and sexual violence. 
Mbeki has been remarkably silent on the issue of sexu-
ality, and it might be surmised that the Constitution pre-
empts any need for him to break this silence.69 The explicit
inclusion of sexuality in the Equality Clause, along with the
political strength of the various organizations supporting it,
foreclose a hyper-masculine, “homophobic” stance of the
type proclaimed in Zimbabwe and allow Mbeki the space
for this silence. While he cannot engage with the same
rhetorical devices as Mugabe, Mbeki’s actions and policies
concerning HIV/AIDS might actually be more transparent
(and consequently more open to detailed and specific cri-
tique) if he were obliged to engage openly with the difficult
issues of sexuality that are so central to the transmission of
HIV/AIDS. His dedication to discussing poverty in relation
to HIV/AIDS serves as an effective strategy for avoiding dis-
cussion of the clinical links between HIV and AIDS, but it
could also be said to do the same for sexuality. The funda-
mental issues of gendered agency (those that determine
one’s ability to negotiate safer sex) are sheltered under the
promise of the South African Constitution, and therefore
avoid serious consideration and comment by polititans.
This combines with the exclusive emphasis on poverty to
 
100 Vol. 7 No. 2
facilitate the lack of declaration on HIV and sexuality that
have characterized Mbeki’s strategy so far. 
For this very reason, in a context of practical inequality
and gendered impoverishment, the limits of formal
Constitutional rights might be measured through the failure
of policies to address the continuation of women’s reduced
sexual agency and disproportionate vulnerability to HIV in-
fection in South Africa.70 It is here that the Constitution can
serve as an “enabling tool,” providing a platform from
which attempts to challenge HIV/AIDS can be launched,
but its effect will still be limited without good governance. 
An explicit example of this is the reliance on the
Constitutional provision of socio-economic rights that en-
abled activists to successfully develop the call for access to
anti-retroviral treatment. Despite its obdurate reticence, the
government has been obliged to initiate new policies and
commit itself to a national treatment program. The extent
to which the government eventually executes a “national”
program is still in question, and effective policy is still de-
pendent on good implementation; but litigation, including
some in the Constitutional Court, has been pivotal in
obliging the government to make a commitment to a na-
tional treatment program official policy.71 The possibilities
of agency reflected in this active intervention in the process
of policy formation and implementation rely on the premise
that the Constitutional Court has the authority to exercise
jurisdiction over the government. As has been demonstrated
earlier, this is an assumption that one cannot make in the
context of Zimbabwe, where the government has perceived
itself to be in conflict with its Court and Constitution.
Consequently, attempts to challenge the policies of the
Zimbabwean government as unconstitutional have been re-
peatedly unsuccessful, casting the possibilities of the South
African Constitution in an ever-more resplendent light.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that another in-
dication of the limits of the formal equality of
Constitutional provision is that South Africa still has an ex-
traordinarily high rate of sexual violence, to the extent that
some researchers label it as “systemic.”72 But in South
Africa, there is at least official recognition of this problem,
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some (if inadequate) attempts on the part of the State to en-
gage with it, and a Constitutional platform around which to
locate strategic objectives.73 In Zimbabwe, the current
political context includes a dramatic rise in reports of sexual
violence. There are widespread reports, for instance, of co-
ercive sex being used explicitly as an instrument of torture
by state-sponsored militia in attacks upon the opposition
and suspected sympathizers.74 Far from attempting to pre-
vent sexual violence, however, reports like these and the re-
sulting impunity suggest that the Zimbabwean government
appears to license such violence. Such an instrumental
usage of sex would be less likely if there were a more devel-
oped context of women’s subjectivity, making them fully
entitled citizens with recourse to legal equality. If women’s
identity were not thought to derive so directly from their at-
tachment to men, their physical integrity might not repre-
sent a terrain of such appropriation. But when considered in
conjunction with South Africa’s “systemic” problem of
sexual violence, it seems clear that the attempts and inter-
ventions of sexual-health policy to “empower” women have
not been able to protect them from a level of base violence
greater and more concerted than ever. Alternatively, it is ar-
guable that the success of policy interventions aimed at de-
veloping women’s agency in South Africa might be meas-
ured by greater levels of reporting of sexual violence, though
there is no way of discovering this with any certainty.
Either way, it is clear that the broader context of gender in-
equalities has to be addressed in order to properly develop
the concept and reality of sexual agency, and that the
Constitutional framework in South Africa provides a
starting point that is not present in Zimbabwe. The contrast
between these situations therefore suggests that while it is
important to acknowledge the limits inherent in the for-
malism of Constitutional rights, a strong and effective
Constitution can provide a platform for popular interven-
tions in democratic governance and the development of
political agency.
Conclusion
The formal recognition of equal rights, then, is not so
immediate and omnipotent a recipe as to provide all South
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African women with an indisputable agency that all
Zimbabwean women are perpetually denied. That is too
simplistic. There are many women in South Africa whose
lives remain relatively unchanged by the primarily bour-
geois petitions that have been made to the Constitutional
Court, and there are similarly women in Zimbabwe who
manage to engage a sexual agency unanticipated by the reg-
ister of primal sovereignty. But in both states, those women
who do manage to exercise some real control over sexual
choices (as they will in practice) may well do so through re-
sorting to unofficial or even illegal methods that will gener-
ally entail disproportionate responsibility taken without re-
course to structural support.75
Current attempts to promote women’s sexual agency
through health interventions will stumble without parallel
attempts to undo the partiality that constrains women’s
legal and social subjectivity in a broader context. Sexual
agency depends on the ability to exercise agency in the or-
dinary contexts that surround the sexual. Such agency
cannot, alas, be conjured by an expression of will or desire.
We cannot simply wish it into being, even if by consensus,
as we first need to undo the obstacles that inhibit its devel-
opment and restructure the habits, patterns, and cultural in-
stitutions that are built on its absence. Interventions that
attempt to invoke women’s sexual agency without first de-
veloping a social context that fosters its operation are in
danger of replicating the contrary consequences of this par-
tial subjectivity once more, as they expose women to in-
creased, possibly violent, censure in their unsupported at-
tempts to exercise sexual agency. Programs and policies
aiming to promote women’s sexual agency therefore have a
clear and unavoidable responsibility to challenge an inter-
pretation of custom that reproduces women’s partial sub-
jectivity. The ability to negotiate safer sex, for example, is
severely circumscribed when the context in which consent
is given is based in inequality.
The examples of Zimbabwe and South Africa suggest
that Constitutional provisions can be a key determinant of
this broader context, either supporting or surpassing the
partial subjectivity that contributes to women’s dispropor-
tionate vulnerability to HIV/AIDS. This is primarily be-
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cause the Constitutions of these two countries engage very
differently with the contrary registers of radical individu-
alism and primal sovereignty and so establish very different
platforms from which to develop and support women’s
agency. The South African Constitution clearly resolves the
tension between rights and cultural authenticity through
the notion of “living” custom. It ushers in a legal frame-
work conducive to initiating the development of women’s
sexual agency. In contrast, the Zimbabwean situation illus-
trates the extent to which a constitution that has neither
symbolic strength nor the practical advantage of an unam-
biguous dedication to human rights can serve to exacerbate
inequities of sex and gender. 
Interventions in HIV/AIDS and sexual health more
broadly cannot shy away from the implications of this. It is
not enough to pay lip-service to the notion of women’s
agency while colluding in maintaining the structures that
block the development of that agency. To be effective in the
long term, these programs must challenge those traditional
structures of customary relations that produce the partial
subjectivity of women if they are to reduce women’s vul-
nerability to HIV/AIDS. 
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